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The 'French-Bread Riot' of 8 September 1778: 






 On the evening of 8 September 1778, a group of French bakers toiled along the 
waterfront in Boston baking bread for the French fleet anchored offshore. The French had 
arrived a little over a week before, battered by a hurricane and desperately short of supplies after 
the failed attempt to capture Newport, Rhode Island. Upon arriving at Boston, one of the first 
things Jean-Charles, chevalier de Borda, Major of the French Squadron, did was to establish 
bakeries on shore to supply biscuit, a hard-baked bread, for the fleet.1 On that particular evening, 
a boisterous crowd approached the bakers and demanded bread. Adhering to their orders from 
Major Borda, the bakers refused to hand over any of the biscuit. The crowd, “being refused…fell 
upon the bakers with clubs, and beat them in a most outrageous manner.”2  Two French officers, 
Lieutenant Grégoire Le Henault de Saint-Sauveur and Lieutenant Georges-René Pléville Le 
Pelley, were nearby and rushed to investigate the disturbance. Coming upon the scene, they 
attempted to restore order and the crowd proceeded to assault them as well. Both were seriously 
wounded, Saint-Sauveur so seriously that he died from his wounds a week later. Major General 
William Heath, commander of the Eastern Military District headquartered in Boston, quickly 
become aware of the situation and dispatched the city guard to suppress the rioters. However, by 
the time the guard arrived the rioters had already dispersed.  
 As the sun rose on the morning of 9 September, the situation appeared very serious 
indeed. Not only had two officers of the French fleet been wounded, one of them mortally, but 
one of the officers was no mere lieutenant. Saint-Sauveur was also the chamberlain to the French 
King’s brother, and he was the brother-in-law of the Comte de Breugon, one of the flag officers 
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in d’Estaing’s command.3 He died from his injuries a week later. In an age when personal honor 
played a major role in the lives of military officers, Saint-Sauveur’s death could have easily 
spiraled into a major diplomatic incident. Piled atop the abuse the French had received from 
General John Sullivan and others following the French withdrawal from the failed Newport 
expedition, this incident had the very real potential to end the young alliance between France and 
the United States. Luckily, cooler heads prevailed in all quarters and both the American and 
French officials did their best to put the incident behind them. It was quickly agreed by all that 
British sailors or Tory loyalists must somehow be responsible for the incident and any lingering 
anger was thus directed against their mutual enemy. By the time the French fleet departed Boston 
in early November the riot had been all but forgotten.   
 And so the story remained for the next hundred years, until revived interest in the 
Revolution on the other side of the Atlantic brought it to light. In the course of compiling a 
catalogue of those French soldiers and sailors who had fought during the war for American 
Independence, one Colonel Chaillé Long, a founder of the French Society of the Sons of the 
American Revolution, came across a reference to the riot in a ship’s log book. Intrigued, he 
wrote to Captain A. A. Folsom, an antiquarian in Boston, asking for details about Lieutenant 
Saint-Sauveur’s burial place.4 The log recorded that the government of Massachusetts Bay had 
promised to build a memorial in honor of Saint-Sauveur. Captain Folsom replied that no such 
monument existed, but did bring the matter to the attention of the Massachusetts state 
government, which voted in 1905 to finally build the monument to Saint-Sauveur. Completed in 
1917, the memorial stands in the yard of King’s Chapel in Boston, where the Saint-Sauveur was 
supposedly buried.  
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 Much of the current literature on this topic is based on writing from this early-twentieth 
century rediscovery. Two major pieces, The French at Boston During the Revolution by Fitz-
Henry Smith Jr. and Economic Conditions in Massachusetts during the American Revolution by 
Ralph Harlow, provided the basis for more recent writers who have tackled the riot. Harlow does 
not mention the riot at all, but those who argue that a shortage of bread was not responsible for 
the riot have used his appraisal of the food situation in Boston during 1778 as evidence. Smith 
devotes a fair amount of attention to the riot, but offers little analysis and focuses on reprinting 
documents related to the affair and its aftermath.5 To his credit, Smith appears somewhat 
skeptical of the attempts to blame British deserters or privateers for the riot, a view shared by 
most of the subsequent authors who have treated the topic.6  However, few have chosen to 
outright question it and those who do generally fail to provide a convincing alternative 
explanation.  
 This paper proposes to do just that. It will reexamine the official explanation to see 
whether British deserters, privateers, or Loyalist provocateurs were indeed to blame for the riot. 
If the British were not to blame, as this paper will suggest, then it follows the townspeople of 
Boston must have been responsible. I use townspeople broadly to include those people, not of 
strictly British origin, who were living and working in Boston during the time of the riot. Given 
Boston’s nature as a port, it is possible that some of those involved could have been foreign-
born, but for the purposes of this examination the important distinction lies between British and 
non-British. A second question then follows immediately from the first; that is, if townspeople 
were responsible for the riot, what drove them to assault the French bakers? We will examine a 
number of possible explanations, including language barriers, anti-French sentiment, and food 
shortages, to see what role they might have played in starting the riot. 
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Responsibility for the Riot 
 
 Writing a few weeks after the riot occurred, an anonymous writer from Roxbury, a town 
just south of Boston, provided a brief summary of its aftermath:   
None of the offending persons having been discovered, notwithstanding the reward that was 
offered, it may be feared that Americans were concerned in the riot; while political prudence 
charged it upon others, that less umbrage might be taken at the event. The count was much 
grieved at what had happened; but had too much calmness and good sense to charge it upon the 
body of the inhabitants, who were no less concerned at it than himself; so that it created no 
dissentions between them.7 
 
If our Roxbury author saw through the apparent attempts by American officials to cover up the 
details of the riot, other people in Boston must have shared similar suspicions. He has laid out 
two major reasons to doubt British involvement in the riot, a lack of arrests and the political 
expediency of blaming British sailors rather than American citizens, which we will now pick up 
and investigate. We will also examine several other factors that suggest the British were not to 
blame. Among these is the lack of evidence provided by American officials about British 
involvement and the inconsistency of their description of the rioters in their private 
correspondence. Additionally, the public efforts made to restore good faith between the 
Americans and the French suggest some level of doubt among the American officials about their 
own explanation. An examination of these factors will show that British involvement in the riot 
was unlikely.  
 Blaming British sailors for the riot held an obvious political attractiveness for the 
American officials in Boston. If the British could be blamed for the death of a French officer, it 
would provide a convenient scapegoat while preventing further damage to the alliance. In fact, 
any shared anger had the possibility to strengthen ties between the two countries by directing 
popular anger on both sides against a mutual enemy. While political expediency itself is not a 
reason to discount the official explanation, it should give one pause before accepting it. Relations 
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between the Americans and French had been tense since d’Estaing’s decision to withdraw from 
the Newport campaign. The French had already failed to assault New York City early in the 
summer and the subsequent failure of the American expedition to retake Newport, which many 
Americans including Major General John Sullivan, the commander at Newport, attributed to the 
absence of the French fleet, only made things worse.8 As a redirection for popular anger, this 
incident could not have come at a better time for the American leaders in Boston. Given the 
overwhelming political benefits of blaming the British, it is unlikely that political considerations 
did not play a role in assigning blame. 
 If British soldiers were to blame for the riot, one would expect a series of well-publicized 
arrests of British sailors to swiftly follow. However there is no record that any British sailors, or 
anyone else for that matter, being arrested or charged with a crime in relation to the riot.9 The 
absence of arrests is telling. The Massachusetts Council, the executive body of the state, issued a 
proclamation condemning the rioters and calling upon all government officials to help apprehend 
those responsible. It even promised a three hundred dollar reward for any information leading to 
the capture of those responsible. 10 Given all of these efforts, it seems odd that no British sailors 
were arrested, if they were indeed responsible for the riot. A public trial would have served the 
interests of the American officials well, providing definitive proof of their commitment to the 
safety of their new allies. However, if the officials doubted the culpability of the British suspects, 
such a public trial could have been majorly embarrassing. Boston had a strong history of 
upholding the rule of law in the face of negative public opinion, most notably John Adams’ 
defense of the British soldiers involved in the Boston Massacre. It is possible that American 
leaders feared a repeat of this situation and so were content to rely on rumor to do their work for 
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them. Regardless, the lack of arrests strongly suggests that the offenders of the official reports 
were little more than imaginings.  
 In addition to the lack of arrests, the lack of evidence against British sailors calls the 
official explanation into question. When writing to Vice Admiral Charles-Hector Count 
d’Estaing, commander of the French fleet at Boston, General Heath provided no evidence to 
support his accusation, simply stating, “Some of the hands belonging to the Marlborough 
privateer are suspected of being concerned in the riot. Orders are sent to the Castle to stop her 
until the matter is fully inquired into.”11 While not making explicit mention of the nationality of 
the hands, Heath is obviously trying to distance any Americans from possible suspicion as it 
turned out the hands in question were British. D’Estaing was quick to grab onto this explanation 
as a way to avoid further conflict, agreeing that, “Some sailors many of whom are deserters from 
the enemy like those said to be found on the Privateer Marlborough have proved no doubt 
suitable instruments to perform what has been done."12 It seems that an unspoken agreement 
emerged between the two of them that, in the absence of any real evidence, British deserters 
onboard the Marlborough would be blamed. The speed at which this agreement was reached, in 
less than forty-eight hours, and the lack of evidence offered by Heath suggests that a motive 
other than fact prompted the accusations. 
 The inconsistency with which American leaders refer to the rioters in private 
correspondence also suggests a political motivation to blaming the British. In the very same 
letter where General Heath blamed the sailors from the Marlborough for starting the riot, he used 
the term “American” to describe the seamen involved in the fray.13  When writing to General 
Washington later the next day, Heath again identified those involved as “American.”14 The 
conversation among American leaders focused on the political ramifications of the riot and their 
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concern that Americans might indeed have been responsible is expressed in the language they 
used. Contrast this with one of the few newspapers to report on the riot, which wrote that the riot, 
“was begun, it’s said, by seamen captur’d in British vessels and some of Burgoyne’s army who 
had inlisted as privateers just ready to sail.”15 It appears that by 10 September, the public 
recorded was already firmly set against the British, while American leaders had yet to make such 
a firm decision, at least in private. That two different conversations were occurring at the same 
time, one in public blaming the British and one in private suggesting Americans were 
responsible, suggests a political motivation behind the public story. If there was clear evidence 
linking British sailors the incident, there is no reason this would not have appeared in the 
correspondence.  
  The plethora of social events hosted by the Americans for the French and vice versa also 
speaks to American officials’ doubts about their own explanation for the riot. In the weeks 
following the incident, the social elite of Boston held a number of lavish events to which a large 
number of French officers were invited. The Independent Chronicle reported that, on the night of 
25 September: 
…at the invitation of the Government of this State, the Count d’Estaing and his officers dined at 
Fanevil Hall, with the Honourable Council and House of Representatives, the Continental officers 
in the land and sea service, the gentlemen of civil and ecclesiastical order, and a great number of 
other gentlemen – it is thought no less than 400, was seated at once at the several tables in the 
Hall. The entertainment was splended. The genuine joy was never observed to rise higher upon 
any public occasion; and the toasts, and every circumstance throughout the day, express’d it in 
the most lively manner; the great and mutual pleasure diffused by the present happy Union 
between France and these States; which British tyranny has now rendered so important to the 
interests of both nations.16 
 
This event was one of several hosted both by the Americans and French over the course of the 
fleet’s time in Boston; D’Estaing returned the favor a few days later and hosted a large group of 
Boston notables aboard his flagship.17 If the leaders on both sides truly believed the British 
element in Boston to be responsible for the riot, there would have been no need for such 
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festivities. True, they also helped heal the wounds from Newport, but there was a noticeable 
increasing in their size and frequency following the riot, suggesting at the very least a correlation 
between the two.18 By hosting these parties, American officials recognized on some level the 
need to apologize for the riot and death of Saint-Sauveur. While such efforts undoubtedly 
represented good manners on their part as hosts, it also speaks to some level of guilt over the 
behavior of their own citizens. They understood some level of mistrust still existed between the 
Americans and the French, and after seeing the potential violence that could emerge, were 
determined to drown it in a flood of toasts and pleasantries.  
 The efforts of American leaders to wine and dine the French, along with the obvious 
political motivations for blaming the British for the riot, strongly suggests that British sailors 
were not, in fact, responsible for the death of Saint-Sauveur. As shown by the inconsistency 
between their own correspondence and the official reports, American leaders themselves doubted 
the veracity of their own version of the story. While they tried to publically pin the blame on the 
British, in private they expressed concern that Bostonians might have in fact been responsible for 
the incident. They were right to worry because if the French believed that Americans were 
responsible, it would have been a political nightmare.  
 
Reasons for the Bostonians to Riot  
 
 Assuming for a moment that the worst fears of American officials were indeed true, and 
the townspeople of Boston were responsible for the riot and the death of Saint-Sauveur, what 
could have caused the Americans to turn against their new allies? A number of the historians 
have offered their own explanation for the riot, but none of these theories have proved fully 
satisfactory because their authors have focused on their own area of expertise and failed to 
account for other possible causes.19 Both Laurence Wylie and Esther Forbes have suggested that 
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the language barrier between the Bostonians and the French bakers helped spark the riot. In 
contrast, William Stinchcombe suggests that flour shortages in the city could have been 
responsible, although he ultimately finds this explanation unsatisfactory. We will examine both 
of these explanations, as well as the possibility that anti-French sentiment among the lower 
classes was responsible for the incident. While it is unlikely that any one of these factors alone 
caused the riot, we will try to determine which ones had a greater influence on the course of 
events.  
 The first of these explanations, that linguistic differences between the French bakers and 
those who approached them that night led to the riot, is the least convincing. One can easily 
imagine a group of American sailors and dockworkers approaching the French bakers, the air 
filled with the warm aroma of baking bread, and being unable to communicate their desire for 
some. The sources are maddeningly vague about whether the rioters demanded free bread or 
were offering to pay for it, but either way the French bakers refused to hand over any of their 
biscuit. Although they most likely could not understand the French bakers’ refusal, it must have 
been very clear to the crowd that they were being refused. It does not follow, though, that 
fighting would inevitably break out as a result of this misunderstanding. 20  Moreover, it appears 
that the French had hired an American to act as the chief baker onshore, who would have been 
able to explain in English why he was unable to give them any of the bread.21 Thus, the 
explanation that language alone was the cause of the riot does cannot stand and it must be 
relegated to a secondary factor.  
 The explanation that a flour shortage in the city sparked the riot proves to be more 
compelling. If the people were desperate for bread and were presented with the prospect of 
freshly baked biscuit, it is unlikely that they would have let a few men speaking a language they 
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did not understand stand in their way. If anything, it probably would have made them angrier at 
the apparent unfairness of foreigners eating their food while they went hungry. Under those 
circumstances, it would not have been unsurprising for some type of violence to break out. The 
food riot was a well-established popular tradition by the eighteenth century and many saw 
violence as an appropriate recourse when one individual or group was unfairly depriving another 
of food. If the authorities refused to take action to rectify the situation, it was not uncommon for 
a mob to take matters into its own hands. Between 1775 and 1779, there were over thirty such 
food riots in the former British colonies, six in Boston itself.22 Those involved in these riots were 
rarely punished and those facing the French bakers probably assumed, rightly as it turned out, 
that they could seize the bread without facing any judicial consequences. Especially given the 
importance of bread in the diet of the urban lower classes during that time, a flour and bread 
shortage would have provided a powerful incentive to attack the French bakers if they were seen 
as withholding food. 
 This explanation is highly attractive, provided there was indeed a flour shortage in 
Boston during the fall of 1778. On this point, historians are divided. William Stinchcombe, in his 
book The American Revolution and the French Alliance, states that the riot occurred, 
“supposedly over the shortage of bread. This explanation is unconvincing, because there were 
three more riots in the following months when the bread shortage had lessened.”23 He however, 
provides no evidence as to how these shortages were alleviated and the sources he cites provide 
only the dates of the subsequent disturbances. In his book In Irons, Richard Buel provides a 
possible explanation for how the city was able to avoid starvation, writing, “Despite its reliance 
on food imports, Boston avoid major shortages until the winter of 1779, thanks to the prize goods 
and imports that could be used to tease surpluses out of the countryside.”24 This explanation is 
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predicated on the availability of surpluses in the countryside, an availability which this essay will 
call into doubt. Additionally, it only applies only to those with access to tradable goods, a group 
that did not include the poorer workers and sailors who most likely comprised the majority of the 
rioters. A number of other historians, including Laurence Wylie, Esther Forbes, and Fitz-Henry 
Smith, have ascribed the riot of 8 September, as well as other disturbances with French sailors in 
the following weeks, to a lack of flour in the city.25 In order to untangle the situation and answer 
our question, we must examine the three major factors contributing to the flour situation in 
Boston: the economic situation of the city itself, the amount of provisions required by French 
fleet during its time in the city, and the demands of the American forces in and around Boston.  
 By the late colonial period, New England had ceased to produce enough grain to feed its 
population, especially with the growth of its larger towns. Production had shifted south to the 
mid-Atlantic colonies, especially Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia, and by the 1750s most 
New England towns were importing flour and rice to feed their populations.26 This movement of 
food relied on seaborne trade routes, routes that were thrown into turmoil by the efforts of the 
British Royal Navy to intercept American trade and by the embargoes on exportation that state 
governments and Congress attempted to impose at various time. This left Boston in an especially 
hard-pressed situation, with British-occupied New York between it and its main supplies of grain 
by 1778. Not that it mattered much, because by the fall of that year the flour economy in the 
mid-Atlantic states was nearing collapse.27 For who had the money and were willing to risk 
either a dangerous sea journey or a circuitous shipment overland, there was the possibility of 
procuring some flour. However, few had those resources and those that did inevitably charged 
high prices for the flour they brought in.28 Thus, access to flour and bread became even more 
closely tied to economic status than before the war. 
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 A number of historians, namely Richard Buel, have argued that privateering was able to 
supply the city with food when interstate trade broke down. He suggested that captured goods 
from prize ships were used to extract whatever agricultural surpluses were available around the 
city.29 Boston did see a large amount of privateering activity during 1778, with over 5000 tons 
worth of shipping libeled in the period immediately before and during the French fleet’s time in 
the city, lending credence to Buel’s theory.30 However, the ability to trade for captured goods 
was predicated on the availability of surpluses in the surrounding area. When the French fleet 
arrived, even with access to far more resources than any individual in Boston, it was only able to 
collect 2,000 barrels of flour in the vicinity of the city.31 The rest of their supplies had to be 
shipped from states further south. The need for the French to depend on supplies from so far 
away suggests a lack of surpluses around Boston. If these surpluses were lacking, as the evidence 
suggests, the competition for flour must have been intense. Those who had access to captured 
goods, especially rum and sugar from the Caribbean, commanded more purchasing power than 
those without them.32 Without access to such goods, most of the artisans and other workers in the 
towns could only complain of being left without anything to eat. 
 One possible explanation, supplied by our anonymous Roxbury author, might help 
explain Buel’s assertions. The Roxbury author claimed that, “New-England cruisers took such a 
number of provision vessels on their way from Europe to New-York, as not only supplied the 
wants of the French, but furnished an overplus…at Boston.”33 If such a claim were true, it would 
support Buel’s assertion that there were no food shortages in Boston during the fall of 1778 and 
buttress Stinchcombe’s doubts about shortages causing the riot. However, a careful examination 
of the prize ships brought into Boston does not support the Roxbury author’s claim. According to 
libel notices, postings from admiralty courts about the adjudication of prize ships in local 
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newspapers, at least 27 ships were captured and brought into Boston between August and early 
November 1778.34 According to Lloyd’s Register, on which most ships carrying provisions to 
the British army in America were registered, only 17 of these ships, totaling 1495 tons, might 
have been carrying provisions for the army.35 Even if every one of these ships were exclusively 
carrying flour, which is unlikely, it would not have been enough to supply the needs of the city, 
the French, and the American forces. So while it is possible that these ships lessened the burden 
on Boston, they could not have supplied the abundance mentioned by Buel. And even if they did 
provide some relief, that relief was not enough to prevent further disturbances between the 
Bostonians and the French in the following weeks.  
 To make matters worse, the depreciation of Continental and state currencies hampered 
the attempts of most people to acquire what flour was available. Since 1777, the paper money 
issued by the Continental Congress and the individual states had been rapidly depreciating.36 
With the impending arrival of the French fleet in the spring of 1778, Congress fully committed to 
the practice of currency finance to fund the war effort. In effect, it agreed to keep issuing as 
much paper money as it needed to pay for the war, and especially to supply their French allies. 
While this guaranteed the short-term ability of the Commissariat to provide for the needs of the 
French, it also meant running the risk of even greater depreciation and possible bankruptcy.37 As 
the value of paper money dropped, New England farmers were less willing to bring whatever 
surpluses they had into the cities because they did not want to sell their crops at a loss. 
Legislative attempts to keep prices down only further encouraged farmers to keep their surpluses 
out of the city.38 Those who lacked access to valuables suitable for trade were thus increasingly 
unable to acquire flour. 
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 Into this mess sailed the French fleet with over 10,000 sailors and soldiers onboard and 
very little left to feed them. The fleet had sailed from Toulon on 13 April 1778, carrying enough 
fresh water to last the fleet three months and enough dry provisions to last about four.39  By the 
time the fleet reached the eastern seaboard in early July, it had been at sea nearly three months 
meaning it would soon be running short of provisions. The need for water was especially 
pressing. Almost immediately following his arrival in Philadelphia, the French Minister to the 
United States, Conrad Alexandre Gerard, began attempting to secure supplies for the fleet.40  
 The weeks following the arrival of the fleet were filled with a flurry of activity as 
Congress and various segments of the Continental supply system scrambled to assemble 
provisions for the French fleet. The Marine Committee took primary responsibility for 
coordinating the supplies from Philadelphia, with the Commissary General for Purchases, 
Jeremiah Wadsworth, being tasked with acquiring and providing the supplies.41 As the fleet 
moved north, various Continental officers, including General Washington himself, attempted to 
provide the fleet with provisions.42 These efforts bore little fruit. By the time the fleet arrived off 
of Newport, Rhode Island, in late July it had still not been supplied with its basic needs. It was 
especially hard up for fresh vegetables, fresh water, and bread. General Heath did his best to ship 
supplies from Boston, writing to General Washington, 
Nearly our whole time for several weeks has been taken up in forwarding provisions, Stores &c. 
to Rhode Island, and in order to accelerate the operations of the Expedition we have sent to that 
place all the provisions that could possibly be spared from the Magazines, in particular flour, of 
which upwards of 1000 Barrels have been forwarded.43  
 
These efforts were to prove doubly embarrassing to the Americans because little of that flour 
reached the French at Newport before they were forced to withdraw in late August and it left the 
bread magazines near empty when the fleet arrived in Boston. In early August, General Sullivan, 
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commander of American forces at Newport, reported that the French fleet “has not more than 
twenty Days Provision on Hand.”44 
 This was the condition of the French fleet’s provisions when it sailed in Boston on 29 
August, effectively doubling the number of mouths to feed in the city in a single stroke. To feed 
the fleet for the two months it would be in Boston, as well as provision it for an expedition to the 
Caribbean, would require an amount of food that for the strained Continental supply system was 
truly prodigious. Major Borda, in his letter asking General Heath to assist in supplying the fleet, 
estimated that the fleet would need over a million pounds of flour for three months. Writing to 
General Washington, Heath expressed his doubts that such an amount could be assembled, 
writing, “but how this quantity can be procured here, especially the Flour, I cannot tell.” 45 
Indeed, such an amount would prove difficult to acquire even in the wheat producing states to 
the south, where the Commissary eventually turned to attempt to purchase it.  
 In addition to the pressing needs of the French fleet, the Commissary also needed to 
supply the American forces in the area around Boston at the same time. The army which 
remained with General Sullivan in Rhode Island and the Continental brigades around New York 
City were already stressing the supplies available in New England. The British decision to cease 
providing supplies for the Convention Army, prisoners captured at Saratoga, meant another 
5,000 mouths to feed around Boston.46 The presence of the French fleet simply added to an 
already stressed system. Wadsworth was painfully aware of his stretched resources, writing 
regularly to both Washington and the Marine Committee to complain about the difficulty of 
obtaining supplies.47  
 To make matters worse for the average Bostonian, the French fleet had brought with it a 
large supply of specie and bills of credit on the French government to assist them in buying 
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provisions. Once it became clear that the Commissary was unable to provide for his fleet’s needs 
in a timely fashion, d’Estaing took matters into his own hands. Commissioning a number of 
agents to purchase whatever flour they could in the greater Boston region, he was able to use 
hard currency and bills of credit to draw about 2,000 barrels of flour out of the surrounding 
countryside for the use of his fleet.48 While these purchases allowed d’Estaing to feed his men, it 
had the dual effect of removing a large quantity of flour from the market and simultaneously 
driving up prices for the flour that remained. By October, Peter Colt, an agent for the 
Commissary, reported that flour suppliers would only accept specie as payment.49 While this 
situation was advantageous for the French, it made the already challenging task of acquiring 
flour even more difficult for the lower classes in Boston because they only had access to the 
depreciated American currency.  
 Thus, the situation for the workers and artisans along Boston’s waterfront, the ones most 
likely to have been involved in the riot, was grim indeed in the fall of 1778. The depreciation of 
the paper currencies and the general collapse of waterborne trade between the states meant 
procuring flour was becoming increasingly difficult. What little flour was available for purchase 
was most likely going to merchants who had access to the kinds of goods farmers were willing to 
trade for. The demands of the American military forces in the region further strained the 
availability of supplies. Once the French began purchasing flour on their own, prices skyrocketed 
and those without access to specie must have had an even more difficult time purchasing flour. 
At least for the poorer townspeople of Boston, the fall of 1778 was almost undoubtedly one of 
acute shortage and want, lending credence to the explanation that hunger brought on by a 
shortage of flour and bread prompted the townspeople to assault the French bakers that night.  
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 Along with the possibility of hunger as a motivating factor, anti-French sentiments 
almost certainly played a role in the riot. The French had been the colonial rivals of Britain’s 
American settlers for over a century and New England’s place bordering French Canada meant 
that many New Englanders had been actively engaged in hostilities against their French 
counterparts at some point during their lives. The conclusion of the French and Indian War 
(1754-63) had brought Canada under British control, but had not ended the animosity that many 
in the colonies felt towards their northern neighbors. Nor would it vanish as soon as the alliance 
with France commenced. Mercy Warren, writing to John Adams, lamented that, “…as there had 
not yet been time to prove the sincerity of either party, I think most of those officers who 
Remember the Late [French and Indian], War (when we Huged ourselves in the protection of 
Britain) Look as if they Wished, Rather than believed ancient prejudices Obliterated.”50 While 
the sources make less mention of the feelings of the lower classes, they likely shared similar 
feelings towards the French. It is quite possible that some of the rioters had even served during 
the French and Indian War, giving them a very personal reason to distrust their new allies.  
 Even those who didn’t serve against the French directly grew up in an environment where 
public displays of anti-Catholic, and by extension anti-French, attitudes were common. The 
largest of these displays was the annual Pope Day parade, celebrated every 5 November in 
Boston and other American seaports. During this event, townspeople would parade through the 
streets with effigies of the Pope, the Devil, and the Stuart claimant to the throne and then burn 
them in a large bonfire.51 Pope Day, and other events like it, encouraged a strong Protestant ethos 
in the city and, by extension, undoubtedly contributed to an anti-Catholic and anti-French 
sentiment among the lower classes in Boston. Unlike members of Boston’s elite, who enjoyed 
ample opportunity to socialize with French officers and thus temper many of the anti-French 
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stereotypes they had grown up with, common people had very little interactions with the French. 
Without such interactions, there was nothing to dissuade them from their notion that the French 
were untrustworthy, effeminate, frog-eaters.52 To see these men who had been so long held in 
contempt apparently stealing bread off of their tables must have angered many of the hungry 
Bostonians. 
 In addition to these long-standing prejudices against the French, more recent events had 
contributed to an air of tension between the new allies. Following the aborted assault on New 
York City, d’Estaing and the fleet had sailed to Newport to assist General Sullivan in retaking 
the port. After several weeks of miscommunication and a hurricane that severely damaged a 
number of the French ships, d’Estaing decided to withdraw his fleet to Boston to refit and repair. 
General John Sullivan publicly censured d’Estaing for this decision and blamed him for the 
failure and subsequent withdrawal of the expedition.53 Tensions ran high and it appeared that a 
public scandal would result. Luckily, through the efforts of a number of American officers and 
the restraint of local newspapers, which refrained from publishing about the incident, such a 
scandal was narrowly avoided.54 
 Although Sullivan latter apologized, many Americans shared his disappointment and 
anger. Having held such high hopes for the new alliance, to have the French sail to Boston 
apparently without having made any major contributions to the war effort was disappointing to 
say the least. James Warren, writing to Samuel Adams in early September, explained that in 
Boston, “we have a foolish spirit prevailing with rancour against the French for leaving Rhode 
Island.”55 While Warren was speaking specifically about the politicians in the legislature, such 
feelings weren’t confined to the elite. General Heath noted that,  
…it is surprising to hear the unguarded and imprudent expression & writings of many on 
this occasion, the severe reflections which are thrown out I fear will give umbrage and if 
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care is not taken wound our great & good Cause. From the unthinking Multitude some 
indiscreet or unguarded expressions may be expected - I wish they may be from such 
only.56 
 
It is highly unlikely that this rancor subsided within a week of the fleet’s arrival in Boston and 
undoubtedly played a role in motivating the riot. There were several more violent incidents 
between French sailors and townspeople over the following weeks, on 26 and 27 September and 
on 5 October.57 These incidents being less well documented than the riot of 8 September, little it 
known about their specific circumstances or causes. However, the persistent conflict between the 
Bostonians and the French sailors suggests they were the result of an underlying tension between 
the two groups. As General Washington noted, disharmony between locals and the French sailors 
proved to be a far greater concern than conflicts of personal honor among the officers.58  
 
Conclusion  
 The alliance between the young United States and France perhaps never came closer to 
ending than on that fateful night in September 1778. A single misstep at any number of moments 
could have spelled the end of cooperation between the two nations and possibly a different 
outcome for the Revolution. The American leaders in Boston, specifically General William 
Heath, did their best to remove any possibility of blame from the townspeople by assigning it to 
British sailors serving on ships in the harbor. Given the lack of arrests or other evidence, it is 
impossible to say for certain who was responsible for assaulting the bakers that night in Boston. 
However, given the strong political motivations that existed for blaming the British, as well as 
the lack of evidence or consistency in the official American accounts regarding their 
involvement, it seems highly likely that townspeople from Boston were in fact responsible.  
 This conclusion seems all the more likely when considering the possible reasons for the 
Bostonians to riot. While the alliance with France ultimately helped secure American 
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independence, for several months it caused substantial hardship among the common people of 
Boston. The food shortage brought on by the presence of the French fleet and the large 
concentration of American forces and British prisoners in the region was the primary motivator 
of the riot, but lingering anti-French sentiment played an equally important part. The language 
barrier between the common Bostonian and the common French sailor also contributed to the 
incident. All told, the strength of the arguments for Bostonian responsibility outweigh those for 
British responsibility, suggesting that the townspeople of Boston were ultimately responsible.  
 This riot serves as a powerful reminder that revolutionary America was not a unified 
America and the experience of some groups differed greatly from the experience of the elites. 
While the alliance with France helped ease the prejudices of many American leaders, it also 
brought common Americans and Frenchmen into occasional conflict. The riot, and the wide-
reaching political consequences it almost had, ultimately serves to remind us of the often 
forgotten power of the common people to influence the course of events. Driven by anti-French 
sentiment and a lack of bread, they came within an inch of irreparably changing the course of the 
Revolution.  
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